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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a summary judgment
in favor of plaintiff-respondent declaring there was
no coverage for Wendy Harvey under an automobile
policy of insurance issued to her brother-in-law, Ronald Strang, with whom she resided.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is
1

substantially correct. This restatement of the facts
is given for further amplification.
Jacqueline Hamberlin, a widow, was the owner
of a 1964 Falcon automobile. Her daughter, Debra,
age 15 years, at the time of the accident in question,
had a learner's permit only and did not have a driver's license. During that month she let the insurance
on the Falcon expire and advised her daughter, Debra, that as soon as she obtained her driver's license
she would renew the insurance on the Falcon and it
would be available for her daughter, Debra, to drive.
The Falcon was normally kept in the garage which
was locked.
On July 30, 1970, Jacqueline Hamberlin left
the keys to the garage and to the Falcon on the drainboard so her son could move some of his personal
belongings in the garage for storage. On that day
Mrs. Hamberlin's daughter, Debra, took the Falcon
without her mother's permission (R 1, 2, 6, 7). She
picked up her friends, Marsha Wood and Wendy
Harvey. Neither Wendy nor Marsha had a driver's
license.
Prior to July 30, 1970, the day of the accident
in question, plaintiff issued its policy of automobile
liability insurance to defendant, Ronald F. Strang,
as the named insured (R 1, 6). The defendant,
Kathryn Strang, is the wife of Ronald F. Strang
and a member of his household. Defendant, Wendy
Harvey, age 15 years, is the sister of Mrs. Strang
and resided with and was a member of the household
2

of Mr. and Mrs. Strang on the date of the accident
(R 1, 6). Wendy had not been through driver's
training, had not obtained a learner's permit, and
had never obtained a driver's license prior to the accident. At the time Debra Hamberlin picked up her
two friends, Marsha Wood and Wendy Harvey,
Wendy knew that Debra had just obtained her learner's permit but did not have her driver's license. She
was fully aware of the fact that Marsha Wood and
herself did not have driver's licenses and that Debra, having a learner's permit, was not supposed to
be driving an antomobile without a licensed driver
being present therein (Harvey Dep. 17).
On the day in question Debra permitted Wendy
to drive the Falcon. While d•:iving it, Wendy collided with Mindalyn Green causing her personal inJUries.

Mindalyn Green and her father, Steven Green,
claim that Wendy Harvey was insured under the
policy issued by plaintiff to Ronald F. Strang. The
trial court found that Wendy was not an insured
under the Strang policy and was not entitled to the
protection thereof. From the trial court's judgment
so holding, this appeal was taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION WENDY HARVEY WAS DRIVING THE
HAMBERLIN AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT THE
PERMISSION OF THE OWNER AND WITH3

OUT THE PE R Nr I S S I 0 N OF ANYONE IN
"LAWFUL POSSESSION" OF THE SAME.

The insurance policy issued by plaintiff to Ronald F. Strang provides:
"USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES
If the named insured is a person or persons, and if during the policy period such named insured ovms a moto1· vehicle covered by
this policy and classified as 'pleasure and business,' such insuranc:e as is afforded by this
policy with respect to the owned 11wtor vehicle
under:
( 1) coverages A and B applies to the use
of a non-owned autonwbile by:
(a) the first person named in the
declarations, or,
(b) if residents of the same household, his spouse or the relatives
of either, and
( c) * * * (not applicable)
(2) * * * (not applicable)
PROVIDED SUCH USE, OPERATION OR
OCCUPANCY IS \\TITH THE PERMISSION
OF THE OWNER OR PERSON IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF SUCH A UTOMOBILE AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
SUCH PERMISSION.
The definition of insured does not apply
to Use of Non-Owned Automobiles."
It is admitted by appellant that the operation or
occupancy of the accident vehicle was without permission of Jacqueline Hamberlin, the owner, (Ap4

pellant's brief, p. 6). It is also without dispute that
Debra Hamberlin did not have her mother's permission to take the Falcon automobile or to operate it
on the date of the accident (Jacqueline Hamberlin
Dep. p. 9-12, Debra Hamberlin Dep. p. 5, 6, 11, 14,
15, 16, R 1, 2, 6, 7). It is without dispute that Wendy
was driving the accident vehicle with the permission
of Debra, the 15 year old daughter of the owner.
The only issue involved on this appeal is the
question of whether Debra Hamberlin was in lawful possession of her mother's automobile and therefore one who could give permission for another to
drive the same. This court in Ashton v. Joyner, 17
Utah 2d 162, 406 P.2d 306, had occasion to consider
a case involving an issue almost identical with the
issue involved in this case. Mr. Joyner was the owner of a truck. While Mr. Joyner and his wife were
out of town, his 13 year old son, without permission
or authority, took the truck in question and while
driving the same was involved in an accident. The
policy in question had an exclusion for any drivers
under the age of 25 other than the insured's daughter, Rosalee Joyner. The truck sustained substantial
damage in the accident. The plaintiff, P. E. Ashton,
repaired the truck and when the owner, Mr. Joyner,
did not pay the bill, Ashton brought this action
against Mr. Joyner to recover for the repair work.
Mr. Joyner then filed a Third Party Complaint
against his insurance company, United Pacific,
claiming that since his son had taken the car without
5

permission, this was a "theft" and that the insurance
company was liable for the damage under the theft
provisions of the policy. The insurance company asserted the exclusionary rider and in addition claimed
the taking was not unlawful. There was no claim in
the Joyner case that the 13 year old boy intended to
deprive his father of the use of the vehicle on a permanent basis. His intent, as in the case now before
this court, was simply to drive the vehicle and return
it, which would amount only to temporary deprivation of the use or possession of the automobile.
The Supreme Court in holding that this was a
theft as that word was used in the insurance policy,
observed that under Section 41-1-109, U.C.A. 1953,
it is a misdemeanor for any person "to drive a vehicle
not his own, without the consent of the owner, with
intent temporarily to deprive the owner of his possession and without intent to steal." The court in so
holding, further said :
"In view of the foregoing policy, it seems
more logical and equitable that this court interpret the term 'theft,' as used in the instant
policy of insurance, as including the wilful
taking or appropriation of one person's property by another, wrongfully and without justification, with the design to hold or make use
of such property in violation of the rights of
the owner."
The court went on to hold that in order to constitute a "theft" within the meaning of that term
as used in the insurance policy, that it was not neces6

sary that the taker have an intent to steal and to
deprive the owner permanently of his possession. All
that was required was a taking without the permission with an intent to deprive the owner temporarily
of the use or possession.
Since Debra admittedly did not have the permission of her mother to take the automobile, she was
not a person in "lawful possession" and therefore
the permission given by her to Wendy Harvey was
ineffective and could not bring Wendy within the
terms of the Strang policy quoted above.
POINT II
THE POLICY PROVISIONS DO NOT VIOLATE
SECTION 41-12-21 (c) U.C.A. 1953.

The Greens at page 7 of their brief refer to Section 41-12-21 (c) U.C.A. 1953 and quote the following portion of that statute:
~'Such operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person named as insured
therein against loss from the liability imposed
upon him by law for damages arising out of
the use by him of any vehicle not owned by
him ... "
They claim the statute quoted sets forth minimum
standards of insurance policy coverage and then argue that since Wendy Harvey comes under the classification of an insured under the Strang policy, that
any attempt on the part of State Farm to provide
coverage in conflict with that statute would be void.
There are two complete answers to this agrnment.

7

First of all, the quoted statute refers to the "named
insured." Ronald F. Strang was the named insured
in the policy issued by plaintiff in this lawsuit. Wendy Harvey was not the named insured. If she is to
be an insured at all, she would come under the omnibus clause of the policy which insures with respect
to non-owned automobiles
"if residents of the same household, his spouse
or the relatives of either."
PROVIDED THE USE OF THE NON-OWNED
AUTOMOBILE IS WITH THE PERMISSION OF
THE OWNER OR THE PERSON IN LAWFUL
POSSESSION AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
SUCH PERMISSION.
In this connection it should be noted that the
same statute quoted by the Greens in subsection (b)
( 2) provides that the policy shall insure
"the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle
or motor vehicles with the express or imnlied
permission of such named insured, * * *"
The point is that this portion of the statute with respect to the "owned aidonwbile" specifically talks
about the named insured and omnibus insureds and
requires that the policy insure not only the named
insured but any other person driving the owned automobile with the permission of the named insured.
Subsection ( c) quoted by appellants, on the other
hand, is talking only about the named insured. Since
Wendy Harvey is not the named insured, the statute
8

on its face has no application to the question now before this court and the policy language is not in conflict with the statute.
A second and equally compelling answer to the
Greens' argument is the fact that Section 41-12-21
U. C.A. 1953 has been held by this court in two separate cases to apply only to cases where one is compelled to secure a policy "after" an accident in order
to be able to continue to drive his automobile, but does
not apply to policies written "prior" to the accident.
The same argument now advanced by the Greens in
this case was made in Western Casualty and Surety
Co. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., et al., 26 Utah
2d 50, 484 P.2d 1180, 1182. The court in disposing
of the argument said:
"We need not dwell on this provision of
the statute, since it applies only to cases where
one is compelled to secure a policy after an accident in order to be able to continue to drive
his automobile. It pertains to policies secured
under the Safety Responsibility Act and has
no application to policies written before any
accident occurs. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.
v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957).
The policies involved herein were written
prior to accident and are to be interpreted the
same as any other contract. In the Chugg case,
supra, this court said at page 402 of the Utah
Reports, 315 P.2d at page 279:
'It being conceded that the policy was
not issued because Chugg had been required by the Commission to furnish proof
of financial responsibility in conformance
9

with the Act, it follows that the provisions
of the Act do not apply to it. Unless
Chugg had been within the purview of the
~ct when the J?Olicy was issued, its provis10ns, unless illegal, are subject to the
same construction as any other contract
in accordance with the exnressed intent
of the parties. * * *' "
,
The California court in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Flynt, 17 Cal. App. 3d
538 ( 1971) had occasion to deal with a similar problem and with policy provisions practically identical
with the policy that is the subject of this appeal.
In that case State Farm had issued its policy of
insurance to Flynt, listing him as the "named insured" and describing a 1964 Mercury automobile as
the "owned automobile." Richard Flynt was Fred
Flynt's sixteen year old step-son who at all times
resided with his mother and Fred Flynt. While the
policy was in force, Richard found a 1962 Chevrolet
automobile with the keys in the ignition, took it without the permission of its owner, and went joy riding
with a friend. During this joy ride an accident occurred and the friend was injured which resulted
in the friend filing a suit against Richard Flynt seeking damages for personal injuries. State Farm
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that 'Richard Flynt was not covered under
the policy in question. The trial court granted State
Farm's motion for summary judgment and on appeal
this was affirmed. In that case Flynt contended that
the summary judgment in favor of State Farm was
10

improperly granted because, among other things, the
policy provision relied upon to deny coverage is
against public policy and not permitted by statute.
This is the same argument that the Greens are making in this case. The court in disposing of this argument, said:
"The insurance policy issued by State
Farm to Fred Flynt contains two separate insuring agreements. Insuring Agreement I
deals with the 'owned automobile;' Insuring
Agreement II concerns 'non-owned automobiles,' Insofar as pertinent here the policy provides, with emphasis added:
'INSURING AGREEMENT I - THE
OWNED AUTOMOBILE
'To pay * * * all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of (A) bodily injury sustained by other persons, and (B)
property damage, * * * arising out of the
* * * use * * * of the owned automobile;
and to d~fend, * * * any suit against the
insured alleging such bodily injury or
property damage and seeking damages
which are payable hereunder even if any
of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent; * * *'
[As to Insuring Agreement I, the policy defines the word 'insured' to include:]
'(1) the named insured, and
'(2) if the named insured is a person or
persons, also includes his or their
spouse ( s), if a resident of the same
household, and
11

'(3)

if residents of the same household
the relatives of the first perso~
named in the declarations, or of his
spouse, and
'( 4) any other person while using the
owned automobile, provided the operation and the actual use of such
automobile are with the permission
of the named insured or such spouse
and are within the scope of such permission, and
'(5)

* * *'

[This definition of insured is not applicable
to Insuring Agreement IL]
'INSURING AGREEMENT II - NONOWNED AUTOMOBILES
'* * * such insurance as is afforded by this
policy with respect to the owned automobile under:
( 1) coverage A and B [bodily injury and
property damage] applies to the use
of a non-owned automobile by:
(a) the first person named * * * or,
(b) if residents of the same household, his spouse or the relatives
of either, * * *
(c) * * *·
'
(2) [Medical Payments] * * *;
(3) [Collision and Comprehensive]
* * *.
'
provided such use, operation, occupancy
or custody is with the permission of the
12

owner or person in lawful possession of
such autonwbile.' "
The court then considered the statutes relied
upon by Flynt and concluded, as did this court in
Western Casualty and Surety Co. and Chugg, supra,
that the statutes did not apply to policies issued "before" an accident but did apply to policies issued for
certification as proof of financial responsibility
"after" an accident.
The Greens to further buttress their position
cite on pages 8 and 9 of their brief two cases as illustrative of courts holding there was coverage under
an insurance policy for drivers notwithstanding the
criminal taking of the automobile by the driver. The
cases are clearly distinguishable and have no application to the question involved in this case. One of
the cases cited is State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Walker, 334 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.
1960), involving a situation where State Farm issued a policy of insurance to Mr. Forrest. Mr. Forrest
had a Miss Lafoon who was a boarder with the Forrest family. She was not a member of the family.
Miss Lafoon owned an automobile which she kept at
the Forrest home, and this automobile was also insured by a standard form family automobile policy.
Mr. Forrest's thirteen year old son, without the
knowledge or consent ofanyone, took the Lafoon automobile and while joy riding around the neighborhood
was involved in an accident with a parked automobile belonging to Mr. Walker.
13

The pertinent provisions of the Forrest policy
as they applied to coverage while operating non-owned automobiles are:
:' (b) with respect to a non-owned automobile,
( 1) the named insured ;
(2) any relative, but only with respect
to a private passenger automobile or
trail0r not regularly furnished for
the use of such relative."
In the TV alker- case coverage is extended with
respect to a non-'owned automobile to:
"any relative but only with respect to a private passenger automobile er trailer not regularly furnished for the use of such relative."
It is obvious this provision is considerably different
than is the provision involved in this appeal. In the
case before this court coverage with respect to a nonowned automobile is extended to:
"the named insured or a resident of the same
household, provided such use, operation or occupancy is with the permission of the owner or
person in lawful possession of such automobile
and is within the scope of such permission."
In the Walker- case there was no requirement
that the use of the non-owned automobile be with the
permission of the owner or the person in lawful possession. Coverage in that case was entended to any
relative while driving a non-owned vehicle so long as
that vehicle was not regularly furnished for the use
of such relative.
14

The other case cited by the Greens is Sperling v.
Great American Indemnity Co., 7 N.Y.2d 442, 199
N.Y.S.2d 465, 166 N.E.2d 482, 83 A.L.R.2d 929. The
same policy provisions were the same as were involved in JV alker. Those provisions were:
"(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile,
( 1) the named insured;
(2) any relative, but only with respect
to a private passenger automobile
or trailer not regularly furnished
for the use of such relative."
The court in Sperling reached the same result
as in Walker. These two cases are completely distinguishable from the case now before this court and
have nothing to do with the issues in this case.
CONCLUSION
Debra Hamberlin without question was driving
1
her mother's automobile without her knowledge, consent or permission. Under the holding of this court
in Ashton, supra, her possession was clearly unlawful. The policy in question was issued before the accident and therefore would be construed according to
its terms. The Safety Responsibility Act has no application to a policy issued before the accident. Even
if the policy had been issued after the accident and
for the purpose of enabling the driver to continue
driving his vehicle, the clear wording of Section 41r 12-21 ( c) U.C.A. ( 1953) relied on by appellants in
this case clearly refers only to the named insured.

l

Il
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By its specific terms it did not apply to Wendy Harvey, who if she is to be an insured must qualify as
an omnibus insured. This she cannot do because she
was not driving the Hamberlin vehicle with the permission of one in lawful possession.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
GLENN C. HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Plaintif!-Respondent
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